Approved For Release 2003/07/30 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100090023-1 25X1

Approved For Release 2003/07/30 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100090023-1

| | Annual For Pologo 2002/07/20 + CIA | DDD70T00666D000400000022-4 | |
|---------|--|---|------------------|
| | Approved For Release 2003/07/30 : CIA- | 1 2 Fet 1059 | 25X ² |
| | ASSOCIATION FOR Director of Control Inte | llignee | |
| | SUBJECT: Her Svidence and Assesse Portet 1938 | mote Concerning | |
| | | | |
| | 1. This recurrences is in response t | o your inquiry concerning the | |
| | desirebility of a new review | of evaluable evidence | 25X ² |
| . [| on the Portet TOM program and recommends | that the Panel not be reconvered | |
| | at this time. | | |
| | 2. For your information, since | substitted its report | 25X |
| | on 14 Governmen 1950, the following algoric | ionat new evidence and assessments | |
| | concurring the fewlet RIM program have b | om obtains: | |
| | a. Seriet ICM Production and D | oplayeant Activities: | |
| , | (1) Following the Enrushche | v statements concerning ICBs | |
| | production, Gill undertook en euc | rement of forist 1221 production | |
| 1 | | 16-1960. This study (not enordinated | |
| ! | entelée CIA) was based on the so | exection that Ebrushsber's statements | |
| | | production started about the beginning | |
| | | uld essist in evaluating the femalbility | |
| | | dity of Moradelaw's statements per se. | |
| | | y of Seriet ICBN activities to Overdioval | |
| 1 | | m. Proliminary findings indicate the | • |
| 1 | | for coviet NSE production, which is | • |
| | | her's eleterous and surrent estimates. | |
| | | | |
| NSA and | d USAF review(s) completed. | | 25X ² |

Approved For Release 2003/07/30 : CIA_RDP70T00666B00010000000023-1

However, the evaluable information done not provide any indication of the initiation of series production or of missile production rates, and therefore does not seem suitable for submission to a Femal.

(3) During private communications at the Gamma Surprise
Attack Discussions, 10 Seventer-18 December 1956, some very
positive Seviet statements were made economics their DCSG, i.e.,
that "they have operational DCSG bases Nov" in more than token
purious. Such statements would be of interest to the Rosel, but
in the absence of supporting evidence, we question their shility
to evaluate the validity of these statements.

25X1D1A

| | (A) There is some new evidence |
|---------|---|
| 25X1D1A | which may be associated with ICBN |
| | deployment; however, the evidence is too tenune to warrant Consultants' |
| | evaluation at this time. We are continuing our efforts to acquire some |
| _ | tion evidence on the status of foriet 1284 deployment. |
| | |
| 25V4D6D | |
| 25X1D6B | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| 1 | |
| | |
| | |

Approved For Release 2003/07/30 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100090023-1

| | ۾ باهيس | | |
|--|---------|---------|--|
| (2) ONI is correctly angaged in a re-evaluation of the possible connections between 25X1 connections between and the Covist RESH program. We have not reached any firm conclusions, but articipate attaining some tentative conclusions within Rad weeks. If our re-evaluation does indicate a definite connection between these two activities, it would be a significant factor in a Consultant Fencel's reasonament of the status of the Seviet 103%. It is too early besever, to evaluate the connection, if any, or to determine the affect on the Seviet land report. (3) The 2 January Seviet land residualisate, if any, one be derived accomming the Seviet 103%. Indicate we have been unable to derive any specific conclusions associates the Seviet 103%, and doubt that any atquirient velid 103% conclusions can be derived therefrom. In these found that the Seviet besid for reasonating the fewiet 103% indirectly, the degree of accord the Seviets have apparently placed on their satallite and lunar programs would have a bearing on the status of the Seviet 103%. In death that this information would provide the Fencel a basic for changing doubt that this information would provide the Fencel a basic for changing | | | |
| (E) ANT is currently engaged in a re-evaluation of the possible connections between | | 25X1D1A | |
| and the forist NUM program. We have not reached any first con- clusions, but articipate attaining some tentative conclusions within 2-4 weeks. If our re-evaluation does indicate a definite connection between these two activities, it would be a significant factor in a Consultant Fancl's resemblement of the status of the Soviet NUM. It is too early however, to evaluate the connection, if any, or to determine the effect on the Bastl's last report. (3) The 2 January Soviet lumar reticle (MECETA) is being core- fully evaluated to determine that conclusions, if any, one to derived concerning the Soviet IUM. Todate we have been unable to derive any specific conclusions associating the Doviet NUM, and Goald that any specific conclusions associations can be derived therefrom. In there- force doubt that MECETA would provide the Consultant Renal a direct basis for reassociate the forist NUM indirectly, the degree of affort the Sovieta have apparently placed on their setallite and lumar programs would have a hearing on the status of the Soviet Form density that this information would provide the Form a basis for changing | | | |
| and the forist NUM program. We have not reached any first con- clusions, but anticipate attaining some tentative conclusions within 2-4 weeks. If our re-evaluation does indicate a definite connection between these two activities, it would be a significant factor in a Computant Fencl's resemblement of the status of the Soviet NUM. It is too early however, to evaluate the connection, if any, or to determine the effect on the Basel's last report. (3) The 2 January forist lumm reticle (MECETA) is being core- fully evaluated to determine that conclusions, if any, one to derived concerning the Soviet NUM. Todate we have been unable to derive any specific conclusions associating the Doviet NUM, and doubt that any specific conclusions associations can be derived therefrom. In there- form doubt that MECETA would provide the Consultant Runal a direct basis for reassociate the forist NUM indirectly, the degree of affort the Soviets have apparently placed on their setallite and lumar programs would have a hearing on the status of the Soviet NUM. We doubt that this information would provide the Famil a basis for changing | | | |
| emakers, but anticipate estaining some tentative conclusions within 2-4 weeks. If our re-evaluation does indicate a derinite connection between these two activities, it would be a significant factor in a Consultant Panel's resonancement of the status of the Soviet 1926. It is too early besever, to evaluate the ensuration, if any, or to detacative the effect on the Swell's last report. (3) The f January Soviet Lunar reliable (MECHIA) is being carefully evaluated to detacate the scalesions, if any, one be derived connectaing the Soviet 1936. Focate we have been unable to derive any specific conclusions concerning the Soviet NUSE, and Sould that any significant ratid NUSE occupations can be derived therefrom. In therefore doubt that HECHIA would provide the Consultant Panel a direct basis for reasonables the Coviet 1939, indirectly, the degree of effort the Soviet have apparently placed on their astallite and lanar programs would have a hearing on the status of the Soviet 1938. We doubt that this information would provide the Fanel a basis for changing | | | (8) ONE to consensity engaged in a re-evaluation of the possible |
| clusions, but ambinipate attaining some tentative conclusions within Rai weeks. If our re-evaluation does indicate a definite connection between these two activities, it would be a significant factor in a Consultant Fenci's resemblement of the status of the Soviet IUSE. It is too early because, to evaluate the commercion, if any, or to detacate the effect on the Storiet last report. (3) The 2 January Soviet laser reliable (SECSTA) is being corefully evaluated to determine what conclusions, if any, one be derived concentrate the Soviet IUSE. Todate we have been unable to derive any specific conclusions concentrate the Devict IUSE, and dealt that any eligible that SECSTA would provide the Consultant Fencie a Street besis for reassessing the Soviet IUSE; indirectly, the degree of affect the Seviets have apparently placed on their satellite and lunar programs would have a hearing on the steams of the Soviet IUSE. We doubt that information would provide the Fencie a besis for changing | | 25X1 | connections between |
| between these two activities, it would be a significant factor in a Commitmant Facel's resonancement of the status of the Soviet 1938. It is too early because, to evaluate the commetten, if any, or to determine the effect on the Parel's last report. (3) The 2 January Soviet Lunar reliate (MECETA) is being correlably evaluated to determine that conclusions, if any, one be derived accounting the Soviet 1936. Todate we have been unable to derive any specific conclusions communing the Portet 1938, and doubt that any standifficant valid 1936 occlusions can be derived therefron. In therefore doubt that MECETA would provide the Consultant Parel a sirect basis for reasonables the forest 1939 indirectly, the degree of account the Sovieta base apparently placed on their satellite and lunar programs would have a hearing on the status of the Soviet 1936. We denote that this importation would provide the Fanal a basis for changing | 25X1 | | and the fortet Kill progress. We have not received any fire our |
| between these two activities, it would be a significant factor in a Consultant Facel's resemblement of the status of the Soviet 1826. It is too early because, to evaluate the consection, if any, or to determine the affect on the Facel's last report. (3) The f January Soviet laser reticle (SCSEA) is being core-ruly evaluated to determine that constant one, if any, one be derived according the Soviet 1826. Sodate we have been unable to derive any specific conclusions occasions one be derived therefroe. In therefore doubt that HERFA would provide the Consultant Facel a direct basis for reasonable the Forest 1826 indirectly, the degree of actor the Soviets bowe apparently placed on their satellite and laser programs would have a bearing on the status of the Soviet 1836. We done that this information would provide the Facel a basis for changing | | : | clustres, but articipate attaining some tentative conclusions within |
| Consultant Fenel's resemblement of the status of the Soviet 1836. It is too early however, to evaluate the commercion, if any, or to determine the effect; on the Bosel's last report. (3) The R January Soviet Lumar rehiole (MECHIA) is being corefully evaluated to determine that conclusions, if any, one be derived concerning the Soviet 1836. Todate we have been unable to derive any specific conclusions associates the Boviet 1836, and dealt that any eignificant valid 1836 conclusions can be derived therefrom, to therefore doubt that MECHIA would provide the Consultant Result a direct basis for recommending the Soviet 1836 infliently, the degree of entort the Soviets have apparently placed on their satellite and have programs would have a bearing on the status of the Soviet 1836. We doubt that this information would provide the Fenel a basis for changing | | i | 2-4 vents. If our re-evaluation does indicate a definite connection |
| Consultant Fenci's recommended of the status of the Soviet 1836. It is too early besser, to evaluate the commention, if any, or to determine the effect; an the Bessi's last report. (3) The R January Soviet Lumar rehiole (SECRIA) is being corefully evaluated to determine that conclusions, if any, one be derived concerning the Soviet 1836. Todate we have been unable to derive any specific conclusions associates the Boviet 1836, and dealt that any eignificant valid 1836 conclusions can be derived therefrom, to therefore doubt that SECRIA would provide the Consultant Result a direct besis for recommending the Soviet 1836 indirectly, the degree of account the Soviets bere apparently placed on their establite and humar programs would have a bearing on the stokes of the Soviet 1836. We doubt that this information would provide the Fenci a basis for changing | | | between these two activities, it would be a significant factor in a |
| determine the effect on the Barel's last report. (3) The 2 January Soviet Lunar reticle (MESTA) is being corefully evaluated to determine that conclusions, if any, one be derived amorphing the Soviet 10ML. Todate we have been unable to derive any specific conclusions associations can be derived therefrom. In these significant valid NOM conclusions can be derived therefrom. In therefore doubt that MESTA would provide the Concultant Resal a direct basis for reasocousing the Soviet NOM indirectly, the degree of affect the Soviets have apparently placed on their satellite and lunar programs would have a bearing on the status of the Soviet NOM. We denote that information would provide the Famil a basis for changing | | | |
| (3) The R Josephy Soviet Lumar redicts (MENSIA) is being core- fully evaluated to determine what conclusions, if any, one be derived concerning the Soviet 10ML. Todate we have been unable to derive only specific conclusions concerning the Doviet 10ML, and doubt that any significant valid 10ML conclusions can be derived therefrom. We there- fore doubt that MENSIA would provide the Consultant Famal a direct basis for reasonable the Coviet 10ML indirectly, the degree of affort the Soviete have apparently placed on their astallite and lumar programs would have a bearing on the status of the Soviet 10ML. We doubt that this information would provide the Famal a basis for changing | | : | It is too early besser, to evaluate the commettion, if any, or to |
| concerning the Soviet ICNA. Todate we have been unable to derive any specific conclusions concerning the Doviet ICNA, and Gallet that any significant valid ICNA conclusions can be derived therefrom. In therefore doubt that MECHA vould provide the Consultant Penal a direct basis for reassessing the Coviet ICNA indirectly, the degree of accord the Doviets base apparently placed on their satellite and lunar programs would have a bearing on the status of the Soviet ICNA. We doubt that this information would provide the Panal a basis for changing | | • | detectable the effect on the Burel's last report. |
| specific conclusions associate the Doviet RUNE, and doubt that any appoints conclusions associate and boviet RUNE, and doubt that any attentional valid RUNE occclusions can be derived therefrom. The therefore doubt that Market would provide the Consultant Runel a direct basis for reasonables the Coviet RUNE; indirectly, the degree of affort the Soviete have apparently placed on their satellite and luner progress would have a bearing on the status of the Soviet RUNE. We doubt that this information would provide the Panel a basis for changing | | | (3) The 2 Josephy Soulet Lamer relation (MEXATE) is being ours- |
| specific conclusions concerning the Boviet RUBE, and Smit that any significant valid RUBE conclusions can be derived therefore. In therefore dealt that HUBE would provide the Consultant Penal a direct besis for remandable the Coviet RUBE indirectly, the degree of affort the Soviet have apparently placed on their satellite and have progress would have a bearing on the states of the Soviet RUBE. We doubt that this information would provide the Panel a basis for changing | | | fully evaluated to determine that conclusions, if may, one be derived |
| specific conclusions concerning the Bovist RUBE, and Smit that any significant valid RUBE conclusions one be derived therefore. In therefore dealt that HUBER would provide the Consultant Rubel a direct beside for reasonables the Covist RUBE, indirectly, the despect of effort the Soviets have apparently placed on their satellite and hear programs would have a bearing on the states of the Soviet RUBE. We doubt that this information would provide the Rubel a basic for changing | | | • |
| significant valid ICRS complication can be derived therefrom. In there- fore doubt that MCCDA would provide the Committent Panel a direct basis for reasonables the Cowiet ICRS; indirectly, the degree of effort the Dowiete have apparently placed on their satellite and lunar programs would have a bearing on the status of the Soviet ICRS. We doubt that this information would provide the Famel a basis for changing | | | |
| besis for recommonsing the Coviet MCRG indirectly, the degree of offset the Sovieta bewe apparently pleased on their satellite and lunar progress would have a bearing on the states of the Soviet MCRG. We doubt that this information would provide the Panel a basis for changing | | | |
| programs would have a bearing on the status of the Soviet FORE. We doubt that this information would provide the Funci a basic for changing | | | fore doubt that Hillia would provide the Consultant Resal a filteri |
| programs would have a bearing on the status of the Soviet ICHE. We doubt that this information would provide the Panel a basic for changing | | • | basis for reasonable the forist 10% indirectly, the degree of |
| programs would have a bearing on the status of the Soviet ICH. We doubt that this information would provide the Panel a basic for changing | | : | effort the feviete have apparently placed on their satellite and lunar |
| doubt that this information would provide the funci a basic for changing | | | |
| | | : | doubt that this information would provide the Panel a basis for changing |
| 101 INC. 101 | | | its last report. |

25X1

SUBJECT: New Evidence and Assessments Concerning Soviet ICTM

- (4) Malinovsky's statement to the Rist Party Congress concerning Soviet ICBH accuracies is interesting but not sufficiently specific to marit an evaluation by the Consultent Panel.
- 3. It is our opinion and recommendation that there is not sufficient significant new evidence concerning the Soviet ICEN program to warrant reconvening a high level consultant penal at this time. However, when some of the above studies are complete or should we acquire some significant new data, we could reconsider the desirability and timing of reconvening the

| a, ve could reconsider the desirabi | |
|---|---|
| | |
| OFFIC HOUSE Assistant Director Research and Reports | MERRETT SCOVILE, JR. Assistant Director Scientific Intelligence |
| | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| | |
| | |

25X1

25X1

25X1



25X1

26 FEB 1959

Major General Charles B. Dougher, USAF Commander, Air Technical Intelligence Center Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Bayton, Chio

Bear General Dougher:

Thank you for your letter of 12 February 1959 in which is described your establishment of a procedure for interchanging information at the working level within the intelligence community.

The results of your program when fully operating on a commodity wide basis should be most rewarding. Ferhaps the program will sugment to a considerable degree the current exchange of information new taking place in the monthly Air Force Working Group meetings. I refer of course to the AFCIN Working Groups on Aircraft and Armaneuts and on Guided Missiles and Astronautics. Incidentally, our participation in these meetings has proved to be extremely beneficial to our analysts.

25X1 NSA We shall be pleased to follow your suggestion that the exchange be on an analyst-to-analyst basis. The views expressed in such comminications would, of course, be unofficial in that they would not necessarily represent the position of this Office.

become a burden, and a free exchange of opinions and informal discussions will be insured, which as you suggest may result in more timely solutions to intelligence problems.

25X1

25X1A9A

Assistant Birector Research and Reports

Approved For Release 2003/07/30: CIA-RDP70T00666R000100090023-1

Approved For Release 2003/07/30 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100090023 1 2 5 2 5 -

25X1

Dr. Otto B. Guthe Assistant Director, Research and Reports Central Intelligence Agency 2430 % Street, M.W. Washington 25, B. C.

Dear Dr. Guthe:

The problem of interchanging information at the sworking level has long been recognized by ATIC and the Intelligence Community in general. The benefits to be derived from informal communication among analysts of different organizations working on similar or related problems include a better understanding of areas of mutual interest, less duplication of effort, and the resultant earlier solution of analysis problems.

In an attempt to alleviate the problem of communication among working analysts, I am establishing a procedure whereby analysts of ATIC will forward informal notes on their findings to analysts of your organization and other organizations working in the same area with a request that informal comments be returned. In this way, mutual benefit may be derived. It is hoped that your analysts will forward notes to ATIC for information and comments in a similar manner.

25X1 NRA

Incl Analyst to

25X1

